Virginia man convicted of Driving Under the Influence and Aggravated Involuntary Manslaughter.

Charles Patrick Goodman (appellant) appeals from his bench trial convictions for driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI) and aggravated involuntary manslaughter, in violation of Code §§ 18.2-266 and 18.2-36.1(B), respectively. On appeal, he contends that (1) the trial court erroneously admitted into evidence the results of blood alcohol concentration *378 testing performed on blood drawn without his actual consent while he was unconscious or incoherent and apparently unable to give actual consent; (2) his prosecutions for driving under the influence and aggravated involuntary manslaughter violated double jeopardy prohibitions; and (3) even if the convictions did not impose multiple punishments for the same offense, contrary to double jeopardy prohibitions, the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for aggravated involuntary manslaughter because it failed to prove both causation and criminal negligence. [DUI and Involuntary Manslaughter are very serious criminal crimes in Virginia.]

First, we hold the taking and testing of appellant's blood while he was incoherent or unconscious did not constitute an unreasonable search in violation of the Fourth Amendment because the blood was obtained in a manner that substantially complied with Virginia's implied consent law. Thus, admission of the test result was not erroneous. Second, we hold appellant's convictions for both DUI and aggravated involuntary manslaughter did not violate double jeopardy principles because the convictions were obtained in a single proceeding and the legislature intended to authorize the imposition of multiple punishments in these circumstances. Finally, we hold the evidence was sufficient to establish the requisite causal connection between appellant's intoxication and the victim's death and to prove appellant's behavior constituted criminal negligence. Thus, we affirm appellant's convictions. [ Question about Double Jeopardy, ask a Virginia Court Lawyer.]

**558 I.

BACKGROUND

Shortly after 8:00 p.m. on Sunday, August 13, 2000, appellant lost control of the vehicle he was driving and crashed into a pickup truck traveling in the opposite direction. Appellant's passenger, Lisa Wright, died from injuries sustained in the accident. [ A VA Court Lawyer can assist you with a case regarding DUI and Involuntary Manslaughter.]

Appellant had been drinking for several hours prior to the accident. He estimated drinking eight to eleven beers between 4:00 and 8:00 p.m. but admitted he “didn't count” how many beers he drank and “it could have been more.” Between*379 about 6:00 and 8:00 p.m., appellant drank at Erma's bar. Around 8:00 p.m., appellant and Lisa Wright left Erma's bound for an establishment called Rob's. Appellant admitted “stumbl[ing]” as they left. They departed in appellant's car with appellant at the wheel, even though appellant knew he was legally prohibited from driving because he had been adjudicated a habitual offender and knew it was not safe for him to drive because he had been drinking. Appellant had experienced no mechanical problems with his vehicle prior to the accident. [ A Richmond VA Attorney can also assist you with cases around the state.]

The accident occurred on a four-lane, divided road with additional exit lanes or ramps bordering both the north and southbound lanes. Immediately prior to the accident, appellant's vehicle had “just come off the ... ramp” and was traveling north in the right through lane at a speed of at least thirty-five to forty miles per hour. Appellant's vehicle came in contact with the right curb and then veered left across the second northbound lane, across the grassy median, and across the left southbound lane into the right southbound lane, where it collided with a pickup truck driven by Louis Durham. Appellant's car was “coming very quickly” and was airborne, and the impact pushed Durham's pickup into the right exit lane. Appellant's car left an arc of “tire smudges” spanning a distance of 218 feet from the right curb in the northbound lanes to the right curb of the southbound access lane. [ Virginia Court Lawyers can also assist you with a case regarding Reckless Driving.]

Immediately after the accident, appellant, who was pinned in the driver's seat, still had “a beer can clutched to his chest,” and numerous beer cans littered the floor of the car and the ground outside appellant's door. Although appellant appeared to be “passed out,” witness Annette Jeter said she “could hear a loud snoring sound” coming from him. She agreed that appellant had facial lacerations and could have had facial fractures, but she testified that, based on her fourteen years of experience as a nurse, she concluded that he was not unconscious because “normally if you are unconscious you don't have a loud snoring; that reflex is basically silent and so you don't really hear a loud sound.”

*380 When Police Officer Bonnie Oaks responded to the scene, appellant looked unconscious, but he was “gurgling something” indiscernible and was “incoherent.” Oaks watched as emergency personnel removed appellant's unresponsive passenger and then cut appellant from the vehicle. Oaks had observed the beer can in appellant's hand and the cans in his car and on the ground. When Oaks leaned over appellant after he had been placed on a gurney, she “could smell the strong odor of alcohol coming from his person.” Oaks then placed appellant under arrest and stayed with appellant while he was transported to the hospital until his blood was drawn for alcohol testing pursuant to the implied consent law.

Oaks tried to instruct appellant on the implied consent law while en route to the hospital, but he was incoherent. Upon their arrival at the hospital at 9:10 p.m., a registered nurse inserted an angiocath and drew several vials of appellant's blood for treatment purposes. Officer Oaks then requested a “court certified blood tech” to draw appellant's blood for testing pursuant to the implied consent law. Technician Steve Parrish arrived at about 9:15 or 9:20 p.m. and withdrew two vials of blood through the same catheter the hospital's nurse had used. Appellant remained incoherent, but he “curs[ed]” and was “somewhat combative” while his blood was being drawn. The evidence established that no fluids or other substances were administered to appellant before his blood was drawn and that only approved solutions not containing any alcohol were used to clean the site on his arm where the catheter was inserted. [ A Richmond VA Attorney can help you file your appeal.]

**559 Parrish gave the vials of blood to Officer Oaks, who mailed one of the vials to the lab for testing and kept the other in the property vault in case appellant wished to have it tested by an independent lab. On the counter beside appellant in the hospital treatment room, next to appellant's wallet and other possessions, Oaks left an information sheet indicating that the second blood sample would be retained by police for seventy-two hours and that appellant had the right to have the sample tested by an independent lab. Detective Matthew Carter then went to appellant's home, where he told appellant's wife about *381 appellant's right to have an independent lab test the second blood sample, and he left her a second copy of the sheet containing that same information.

Laboratory test results admitted into evidence indicated that appellant had a blood alcohol concentration (BAC) of 0.29%. [ The adult BAC legal limit in Virginia is 0.08.]

At trial, appellant testified in his own defense, claiming for the first time that he thought passenger Lisa Wright had taken his wallet as they bumped into each other while leaving the bar and that she had removed the money and then pretended to have found the empty wallet on the seat of his car once they got in. He said that he confronted her about the missing money while they were driving to Rob's, that she “grabbed his wrist” and “arm ... and jerked [him],” and that he did not remember anything after that until he saw his wife in the emergency room.

Appellant argued at trial that the BAC test results were inadmissible. The trial court ruled the BAC results were admissible as the product of a consensual search because the officer's actions substantially complied with the implied consent law. In the alternative, it held the nonconsensual, warrantless seizure of appellant's blood was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment because the police had probable cause to arrest and reasonably feared loss of evidence and because the blood was taken in a reasonable manner.

Appellant also argued that his conviction for both DUI and aggravated involuntary manslaughter arising out of the same act of driving under the influence would violate double jeopardy prohibitions. The trial court implicitly denied the claim when it convicted appellant of both offenses.

Finally, appellant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to prove that his intoxication caused the accident and that his behavior constituted criminal negligence. In convicting appellant of DUI and aggravated involuntary manslaughter, the trial court made the following findings:

[T]he elements of [the] offense have been proven by your conduct prior to your operation of the motor vehicle in the *382 alcohol which you consumed prior to getting behind the wheel; the fact that you didn't have a license and the actions which you took while driving immediately prior to this accident. And that ... show[s] a total wilful disregard of human life ... by your wilful, wanton conduct in driving. [ Do you have questions about something regarding a Criminal Case in Virginia, visit a Virginia Court Lawyers Blog.]

Man convicted of agravated involuntary manslaughter, felony hit-and-run, and driving under the influence while underage in Henrico County.

Steven Michael Wyatt (appellant) appeals from his jury trial conviction for aggravated involuntary manslaughter under Code § 18.2-36.1(B).FN1 On appeal, he contends the evidence was insufficient to support a finding that his conduct causing a death “was so gross, wanton and culpable as to show a reckless disregard for human life,” as required for a conviction for violating Code § 18.2-36.1(B). We hold the evidence was sufficient to support a finding that appellant was criminally negligent, and we affirm the conviction. [ This is a serious automobile related charge in Henrico County]

FN1.FN1. Appellant also was convicted for felony hit-and-run and the misdemeanor of driving under the influence while underage. He noted an appeal of all three convictions, but his assignments of error impact only the aggravated involuntary manslaughter conviction.

I.

BACKGROUND

Shortly after 7:15 p.m. on November 23, 2001, after dark, Paulette Shaw was driving her Ford Explorer eastbound on a straight, two-lane road with a speed limit of 55 miles per hour. *414 The road was dry, paved asphalt that was “in very good condition” and **120 was marked with a double yellow line down the center. At that time, witnesses traveling eastbound behind Shaw's Explorer saw the headlights of appellant's westbound vehicle swerve into the eastbound lane. Both front tires of appellant's vehicle “were across the yellow line.” The driver's side front fender and wheel of appellant's vehicle contacted some portion of the driver's side of Shaw's vehicle. Appellant's vehicle then “bounce[d]” “sharply back into ... the westbound lane of traffic and kept going,” narrowly missing at least one of the cars behind Shaw's Explorer. Shaw's vehicle hit a tree, and Shaw was killed.

Although the road was straight in the area where the accident occurred, appellant's vehicle was “right ... at the crest of” a “gradual” “little” “hill” when it started “coming over and into [the eastbound] lane of traffic.” However, the evidence established that, even if a vehicle was on the crest of the hill, its driver could clearly see ahead “[p]robably one hundred yards” “regardless of the incline or decline.” [ A Richmond VA Lawyer can also assist you with a case in Henrico County]

State Troopers John Facchina and William Harden were dispatched to the accident scene. Shortly after 7:30 p.m., they found appellant's abandoned Mitsubishi by the side of the road a little over a mile from the scene of the collision and noticed “what appeared to [be] fresh damage on the front fender and driver's front wheel.” They then proceeded to the actual scene of the accident to interview witnesses and conduct an investigation at that location. Trooper Facchina examined the road where the accident occurred and found no “brake marks in either direction which could have possibly come from either vehicle.” Between about 8:45 and 9:00 p.m., Trooper Facchina again examined the Mitsubishi and found an open can of beer sitting in the console between the two front seats. The can was half-full and cold. [ Driving with an open container is a criminal offense in Henrico County]

Troopers Facchina and Harden then proceeded to appellant's residence, where they found him “obviously flustered and visibly upset,” with his “clothes ... in disarray.” Appellant told the officers that the accident occurred when a vehicle *415 crossed the center line and struck his car, saying he thought “the other driver caused the accident.” Appellant was “very talkative,” his speech was slurred, and he had the odor of alcohol on his breath.

Appellant told the troopers he had left work at about 4:30 p.m. and went to Bungalow Billiards to shoot pool. Appellant, who was born in 1982 and was 19 years old at the time, admitted he had a Department of Motor Vehicles identification card bearing a name other than his own and a birth date of 1980, which he used to buy alcohol. Appellant said he consumed “five or six beers and a shot of Hennessy” while at the pool hall and then departed for home. He denied having anything to drink “since he left the bar.” Appellant said that, when he left the bar, “he felt okay to drive, but he felt buzzed.” [ Drunk Driving is a serious crime in Virginia]

Appellant left the scene of the accident without stopping, and said he was concerned because he had been drinking and he did not want to be arrested for driving while intoxicated. He was trying to get home but “[t]he vehicle wouldn't go any further after about possibly two miles from the scene,” at which time he pulled to the shoulder, “slipped into the woods on the east side” of the road, and “used his cell phone to call his family to come pick him up.”

When the troopers took appellant into custody and “walk[ed] him down from the porch,” Trooper Harden noticed “he was somewhat unsteady on his feet.” A breathalyzer administered at 10:22 p.m., a little over three hours after the collision, showed an alcohol content of 0.07 grams per 210 liters of breath.

Appellant was tried for aggravated involuntary manslaughter, felony hit-and-run, and driving under the influence while underage, and the jury convicted appellant of the charged offenses. As recommended by the jury, appellant was sentenced to serve seven years for the aggravated involuntary manslaughter conviction and four years for the hit-and-run conviction, to run consecutively, and he was given a fine of *416 $500 for the offense of underage driving under the influence.

Man convicted of Felony Reckless Driving while his license was revoked.

Bobby Jasper (appellant) appeals from his bench trial conviction for the felony of reckless driving while his license was revoked after having twice been convicted of driving under the influence.FN1 On appeal, he contends the trial court erred in admitting his Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) transcript,*751 over his Confrontation Clause objection, to prove that his license had been revoked and that he had notice of the revocation. We hold the admission of appellant's DMV transcript did not violate the Confrontation Clause, and we affirm.

FN1.FN1. Appellant also was convicted of eluding a law enforcement officer, but he does not challenge that conviction in this appeal. [ A Virginia Court Lawyer can assist you with your Appeal]

I. BACKGROUND

At about 5:45 p.m. on August 26, 2005, Louisa County Sheriff's Corporal Christopher Powell observed appellant driving a Ford Tempo on Route 250. Corporal Powell “knew that from a previous arrest back in July of [appellant], ... he was suspended or revoked, DUI related.” Corporal Powell activated his lights and followed behind appellant's vehicle. Appellant did not stop immediately but eventually pulled over and exited **408 his vehicle, and Corporal Powell took him into custody.

Appellant was indicted for “feloniously driv[ing] or operat[ing] a motor vehicle on the highway in a manner that endangered the life, limb, or property of another after his driver's license or privilege to drive had been revoked based on a conviction of driving while intoxicated, 2nd offense.”

At trial for the offense on January 26, 2006, the Commonwealth offered into evidence appellant's Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) “Transcript of Driver History Record as of 2006/01/24.” The transcript showed it was requested by “CA RD Short,” which appellant represents on brief was Commonwealth's Attorney R.D. Short. It also contained the following printed information: “* * *Attention: Revoked DUI 2nd 46.2-391* * *”, “* * *Notice of Suspension/Revocation Received* * *”, and “Driver License Status: Revoked.” It showed a conviction for second offense driving under the influence rendered on October 19, 2001, with a concomitant license suspension of three years. It also showed a suspension for an “indefinite” period effective July 19, 2004, based on “ct order fail to pay fine,”“conviction: 2001/10/19 Circuit Ct Charlottesville City,”“Notified: 2001/10/19 by Court DC225.”

The transcript contained the following attestation clause:

*752 This is to certify, in accordance with Section 46.2-215 of the Code of Virginia, that this machine produced transcript, transmitted by electronic means to CA RD Short is an accurate depiction of the driving record of Jasper, Bobby, DL No [as listed], as maintained by the Virginia Department of Motor Vehicles as of [2006/01/24]; and that all notice of orders indicating personal delivery to the driver were sent and received by the driver pursuant to Section 46.2-416 of the Code of Virginia. [ A Richmond VA Lawyer could also assist you in this type of case in Henrico]

Demerst B. Smit

Commissioner

Appellant objected to admission of the DMV transcript on the ground that its contents were “testimonial” hearsay under Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004). He argued as follows:

[U]nder the narrowest construction of ... Crawford, the core class of testimonial statements would include affidavits and any similar pretrial statements a declarant would reasonably expect would be used prosecutorially.... This is obviously an attestation of somebody out of court that certain records were reported to it and were accurate, rather than the actual records of the revocation and of the-this is obviously an out-of-court statement by a ... declarant. And ... obviously it is something [that] would reasonably [be] expected to be used prosecutorially. That's what these are for obviously. So for these reasons, based on [ Crawford,] we say that this is testimonial and we would ask the Court to exclude it.

The trial court overruled the objection, briefly describing the holding in Crawford and reasoning as follows:
The Court has seen no case where [ Crawford's statements about testimonial hearsay] have been applied to the official records of the Commonwealth, in this case the Department of Motor Vehicles.... The matters that would be the subject of the substance of this record would generally be in two categories. One, court documents showing various court dispositions in which the defendant would have been present or had the opportunity to be present or the official *753 acts of the Department of Motor Vehicles and their records, which the Court finds to be fundamentally different than the concern that was addressed in Crawford of a wife's statement being used against her husband.... So based upon those reasons the Court will overrule the Crawford objection.... [ Having a lawyer familiar with Reckless Driving will be helpful]

The trial court convicted appellant of the charged offense, and after sentencing, he noted his appeal.

Man convicted of several automoble related Felonies and Misdemeanors in Henrico County.

The issue in this appeal is whether the evidence was sufficient as a matter of law to prove that Peter Mark Milazzo was guilty of felony hit and run, in violation of Code § 46.2-894. [ This case involves Felonies and Misdemeanors, a Virginia Court Lawyer would be able to help you with both]

I

Milazzo was tried without a jury in the Circuit Court of Mecklenburg County. The court found Milazzo guilty of felony eluding the police, in violation of Code § 46.2-817(B); felony destruction of property, in violation of Code § 18.2-137(B); felony failing to stop at the scene of an accident, in violation of Code § 46.2-894; and misdemeanor reckless driving, in violation of Code § 46.2-852. These are serious automobile crimes in Henrico County]

Milazzo appealed to the Court of Appeals his conviction for failing to stop at the scene of an accident. A judge of the Court of Appeals, in a per curiam order, denied the petition for appeal. Milazzo v. Commonwealth, Record No. 0795-07-2 (Sept. 26, 2007). Thereafter, a three-judge panel of the Court of Appeals also denied the appeal. Milazzo v. Commonwealth, Record No. 0795-07-2 (Dec. 20, 2007). We awarded Milazzo this appeal.

*736 II

The facts relevant to this appeal are not in dispute. On August 9, 2006, Milazzo was the operator of a motor vehicle in the Town of South Hill. Corporal W.S. Johnson of the town police department stopped Milazzo for speeding. When Corporal Johnson advised Milazzo why he was stopped, Milazzo became belligerent, put his car in gear, and sped away. [ A Richmond VA Lawyer could also assist you in Henrico County]

Corporal Johnson pursued Milazzo's car through several streets of the town. During this pursuit, Milazzo exceeded the posted speed limit and ignored several stop signs and red traffic lights. He also crossed a double solid line to pass several cars. Eventually, Milazzo drove onto Interstate 85 where South Hill Police Officer Mike Waters joined in the pursuit. When Corporal Johnson endeavored to pass Milazzo's car, Milazzo swerved his car toward Johnson. Milazzo drove his vehicle onto an exit ramp where he lost control of his car temporarily. The car spun around and came to a stop.

Corporal Johnson placed his police car behind Milazzo's car, and Officer Waters placed his car in front of Milazzo's car. Milazzo first drove forward and “rammed” Officer Waters' car. He then backed up, striking Corporal Johnson's vehicle, and again drove forward, striking Officer Waters' car a second time.

When Milazzo was unable to drive away from the scene, he exited his car, jumped over a guardrail, and fled on foot into a wooded area. The police apprehended him later that night. [ This type of case would call for an expert Attorney familiar with automoblie charges like reckless driving, ect.]

III

Code § 46.2-894Code § 46.2-894 provides, in pertinent part, as follows:

The driver of any vehicle involved in an accident ... in which an attended vehicle ... is damaged shall immediately stop as close to the scene of the accident as possible ... and report his name, address, driver's license number, and vehicle registration number forthwith to the State Police or local law-enforcement agency ... or to the driver or some other occupant of the vehicle collided with.

In denying Milazzo's petition for appeal, the Court of Appeals noted in its per curiam order that “[t]he purpose of Code § 46.2-894‘is to prevent motorists involved in accidents from evading civil or criminal liability by leaving the scene of an accident and to require drivers *737 involved in an accident to provide identification information and render assistance to injured parties.’ ” Milazzo, slip op. at 2 (quoting Smith v. Commonwealth, 8 Va.App. 109, 115, 379 S.E.2d 374, 377 (1989) (decided under former Code § 46.1-176)). The Court of Appeals also noted that the **160 word “accident” is defined, in part, as “ ‘an unfortunate event.’ ” Id. (quoting Smith, 8 Va.App. at 114, 379 S.E.2d at 377 (quoting Webster's Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary 5 (1963))). The Court of Appeals determined that the trial court could conclude, from the evidence presented, that Milazzo had been involved in an “unfortunate event” and, pursuant to Code § 46.2-894, had the duty to remain at the scene and provide information.

IV

On appeal, Milazzo contends, as he did in the Court of Appeals, that his conduct was intentional and that, therefore, he was not involved in an “accident.” The Commonwealth contends that the term “accident,” as used in a so-called hit-and-run statute, is not limited to unintentional incidents. The Commonwealth relies, in part, upon State v. Smyth, 121 R.I. 188, 397 A.2d 497 (1979).

In Smyth, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island considered the meaning of the word “accident,” as used in a statute that requires a driver involved in a highway accident resulting in personal injury to render aid to injured persons, to provide certain information to the other parties to the accident, and to notify the police. Id. at 499. The defendant had been charged with, and convicted of, leaving the scene of an accident in which personal injury had occurred, and he contended that the collision, because it was intentional, was not an accident within the meaning of the statute. Id. at 498. In affirming the defendant's conviction, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island stated that the purpose of the statute is to protect injured persons and to assure the fair assessment of financial responsibility. Id. at 499. The Court further stated that the statute “is unconcerned with the cause of the accident-whether it be by act of God, by negligent conduct, by willful or wanton conduct, or by intentional act.” Id. The Court explained its rationale as follows:

We do not believe that the statute's reporting requirements should depend on the mental state of the actor involved in a vehicular collision. From the viewpoint of the perpetrator of an *738 intentional act, the act is surely not an accident within the more common definition of the term. But from the perspective of the injured victim, the primary beneficiary of the statute, he or she has been involved in an accident and needs the same protections afforded other highway casualties. Therefore, we believe that the Legislature intended the term “accident” to include all automobile highway collisions-intentional as well as unintentional-where personal injury occurs. [ If you are unsure of somthing your case you should ask a Virginia Court Lawyer]

V

In the present case, we agree with the Commonwealth and the reasoning of the Supreme Court of Rhode Island in Smyth. The purpose of Code § 46.2-894 is to protect persons injured as the result of, and to ensure the assessment of liability arising out of, an unfortunate vehicular event. The statute's primary beneficiary is the injured victim, and it makes no difference whether the collision was intentional or unintentional. Therefore, the evidence was sufficient to prove that Milazzo was guilty of felony hit and run, in violation of Code § 46.2-894.

VI

Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

Henrico County VA Reckless Driving

In Virginia, Reckless driving is classified as a class 1 misdemeanor carrying a potential maximum of one year in jail, $2,500.00 in fines, and potentially a suspension of your driver's license.

Virginia Reckless driving in Henrico County and Richmond is a serious charge. Counting on the expertise of an experienced, high quality Virginia reckless driving defense attorney is extremely important to protect your freedom, your finances, and even your privilege to drive in Virginia.

A Virginia reckless driving lawyer will aggressively defend your case. As your Virginia attorney, our firm will verify that the device used to measure your speed and the methods used to measure your speed, whether radar, laser, or pace, complies with all the statutory requirements. If a requirement is not met, we will aggressively fight to have the VA reckless driving charge dismissed.